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The influence of foreign cultural values on Dutch social security law 
 




A country’s social security system is a mirror of its society’s norms and values. That does 
not mean, however, that social security law is homogenous in the sense of its being based 
on a one-dimensional concept of humanity that disregards cultural diversity. For instance, 
Dutch social security law provides for exemption from public insurance on the basis of 
religious objections. This provision was instituted to accommodate the conviction held 
among certain Protestant Christians that it is not permissible to deliberately cover oneself 
against risks, which should be accepted as an inevitable expression of God’s will. To an 
objective outsider, the cosmetic nature of this provision will be apparent. The fact is, while 
religious objectors do not contribute to social security funds, they are expected to cough up 
a kind of substitute tax. In the event a risk materialises, the objector can use the savings 
accumulated as a result of this taxation to support him or herself, in the form of a sort of 
substitute benefit or pension. The provision for objectors on religious grounds is full of 
legal oddities; it serves a small group of about 1,700; it shows how tolerant social security 
can be in respect of the feelings of minorities. Multiculturality avant la lettre! 
 The above provision reflects particularly the cultural diversity that exists within 
traditional Dutch society, and a tolerance towards deviant customs and ideas that has been 
further tested in recent decades by the arrival of minority groups from outside the 
Netherlands, not least as a result of migration. Dutch society has rapidly been becoming 
increasingly heterogeneous, and this has left marks on the interpretation and design of the 
legal system. The influence of new population groups on social security law takes place 
step by step under the influence of case law and the policy of the implementing 
organisations. The process is therefore not always immediately visible, but if the 
developments are observed over a longer period of time, the influence is clearly to be seen. 
 
 
1. Three case studies of multiculturality 
 
The multiculturalisation of the law can be understood as a process in which foreigners 
contribute to the shaping and development of the law by their presence – whether 
permanent or not – in a country.1 This article will investigate the way in which this process 
is taking place in social security law and will examine the questions to which this process 
gives rise. As it is beyond the scope of this article to give a complete overview of the 
multiculturalisation process within social security, we have opted for a case study 
approach, focusing on three areas where social security conventions have come under 
pressure through the arrival of groups of foreigners in the Netherlands. 
 
The first topic is the gradual evolution of the criterion of residence used in Dutch national 
insurance. We are not speaking specifically about the penetration of new cultural ideas, 
                                                     
1
 Cf. M. C. Foblets and B. Hubeau, ‘De inkleuring van het recht door toedoen van nieuwe culturen. De 
aanzet tot een sociaal-wetenschappelijke studie van de impact van de migratie op het rechtsvormingsproces 
in Nederland en België’, in: M.C. Foblets, B. Hubeau and S. Parmentier (ed.) Migranten kleuren het recht in. 
Leuven , Acco 1997. NB: the writers refer specifically to a permanent stay, but we will not apply that 
limitation to this article because the confrontation with foreign cultural concepts in social security manifests 
itself just as clearly if the immigrant’s stay is not permanent. 
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here, but rather about the influence of the phenomenon of migration on the law. It is 
particularly interesting to examine whether society’s perception of immigration leaves 
traces in normative reality. 
 The second topic relates to the effects of foreign legal concepts such as adoption, 
marriage and acknowledgement on the Dutch National Child Benefits Act (hereafter: 
AKW). In relation to many countries, insurants are entitled to child benefit for children 
living abroad. The arrival of migrants from countries with a dissimilar legal culture has 
raised the question of whether the child’s foreign family law status should be recognised 
for the purposes of Dutch child benefit. What does case law tell us about this? Does Dutch 
social security law promote or impede tolerance to foreign norms and values? 
 The third and final topic concerns the concept of the ‘member of the family’. In this 
framework, we start by discussing problems associated with the export of Dutch cultural 
values to other countries. In Dutch social security law, marriage is equated with sharing a 
household with a partner, the sex of the partners being irrelevant. This modern view can 
lead to clashes with foreign cultural values when Dutch pensions and benefits are paid in 
other parts of the world. We then proceed to discuss the way in which the concept of 
member of the family as referred to in European social security law is finding itself under 
pressure from non-European ideas about the family. 
 Our article closes with a critical look at the multiculturalisation process taking place 
in social security. The question, after all, is whether it might be possible to arrive at more 
general conclusions for social security law on the basis of the three topics. 
 
1.1. The evolution of the criterion of residence 
 
The Dutch national insurance schemes cover the risks of old age, death, children and 
exceptional medical expenses. These four schemes have common descriptions for the 
insurants. Firstly, insurants include residents. These are people who live in the Netherlands 
and whose residence status is assessed according to circumstances as prescribed by the 
law. The concept of residence is further elaborated in case law, showing that a person must 
have long-lasting personal ties to the Netherlands; the focus of a person’s social life must 
be in the Netherlands. Incidentally, this requirement of intensive ties with the country of 
residence is not unusual in European social security law. For instance, there is the UK term 
ordinary residence2, and the German term gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt.3 
 
As mentioned above, the interpretation of the central insurance criterion of residence has 
been subject to changes as a result of the arrival of migrant workers in the Netherlands in 
the late 1960s and the family reunifications that followed in the ’70s and ’80s. In a recent 
publication, O. Brinkman aptly reveals the way in which these changes have taken shape in 
the case law of the Central Court of Appeal.4 He juxtaposes three judgments, each 
concerning Moroccan nationals who had left their families in Morocco and come to work 
in the Netherlands.  
 
 In the early ’70s, the Central Court of Appeal still believed that there was no 
question of residence in such cases.5 The Court judged that, “a foreign gastarbeider 
(literally: guest worker) whose family remains in his country of origin, who regularly visits 
                                                     
2
 Cf. A.Ogus, N. Wikeley’s, The law of social security. London, Butterworths 1995, p. 393 ff. 
3
 Paragraph 30 of the general part of the Sozialgesetzbuch. 
4
 O. Brinkman, ‘De AOW: grand old lady nog niet met pensioen’, in: PS-special, No.2, 2001, p. 59-68. 
5
 Central Court of Appeal, 11 Nov. 1971, RSV 1972/48. 
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this family when on leave and who also maintains normal contacts with this family, 
continues to be a resident of that country.” The use of the term guest worker in this 
consideration illustrates the expectation held at the time that the migration that was taking 
place for labour purposes would turn out to be a temporary phenomenon. It was assumed 
that guest workers would eventually return to their country of origin. It was further 
concluded on the basis of this expectation that coverage under Dutch national insurance 
was out of the question.  
 By the late 1970s, a shift is discernible in case law. In a judgment of 1977, the 
Court ruled that “it is going too far to assume that a foreign worker whose family stays 
behind in the country of origin and who maintains regular contact with the family can 
never be a resident of the Netherlands as well”.6 Here, we see that it was no longer 
inconceivable that a migrant worker could build up such intensive ties to the Netherlands 
that residence could be applicable. The term gastarbeider (guest worker) was dropped, and 
replaced by the term buitenlandse arbeider (foreign worker).  
 In the mid-80s, the Court took a step further. In a judgment of 19857, it appears that 
maintaining economic ties with the Netherlands constitutes an important reason to assume 
residence: “The employment history of the person concerned leads to the conclusion that 
ties have gradually come about between that person and the Netherlands as a result of 
which he and his family have become entirely or almost entirely dependent on his 
possibilities for earning income in the Netherlands.” In this case, residence was assumed to 
apply from the point in time that a second job was accepted in the Netherlands. Regarding 
terminology, the migrant worker is now referred to neutrally as the person concerned. 
 On the basis of a quarter of a century of developments in case law, the concept of 
residence subsequently took further shape in implementational policy. Today, the 
assessment of residence is based on the actual circumstances, tested against three objective 
material criteria: the extent to which a person has legal, economic and social ties with the 
Netherlands.8 This legal development shows that the interpretation of the term residence 
has adapted to the reality of migration and the way in which this reality has been perceived 
in society. Rather than a subjective perception of the phenomenon of migration, the 
objective circumstances of a migrant in the Netherlands now constitute the deciding factor. 
 Incidentally, the concept of residence underwent a similar shift in meaning under 
the influence of migration with respect to the phenomenon of the dual place of residence. 
Initially, case law was based on the assumption that a person could only be a resident of 
one country at a time, i.e. either the Netherlands or another country. This idea, however, 
was at odds with the situation of older migrants who had become eligible for 
pensions/benefits and had not entirely severed their ties with their country of origin. Some 
of these people have kept the Netherlands as their country of residence while spending 
several months each year in their country of origin. It was situations like these that led the 
Central Court of Appeal to accept in 1994 that such cases are cases of dual residence.9 
Therefore, maintaining ties with the country of origin does not preclude residence in the 
Netherlands. 
 
1.2. The effects of foreign legal concepts 
 
                                                     
6
 Central Court of Appeal 4 July 1979, RSV 1979/230. 
7
 Central Court of Appeal 19 Dec. 1985, RSV 1986/166. 
8
 Central Court of Appeal 7 June 1989, RSV 1990/420. 
9
 Central Court of Appeal 15 June 1994, AB 1995,76. 
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The effects of foreign legal concepts constitute a very different kind of issue. The question 
here is to what extent legal arrangements in foreign personal and family law can be 
considered as equivalent to the corresponding Dutch legal arrangements for the purposes of 
Dutch social security law. This question is of particular relevance to the implementation of 
the National Child Benefits Act (AKW). This is not only because the relationship between 
the carer and the child under family law is often crucial for entitlement to child benefit but 
also because the AKW comprises an important international component, notably because 
insured parents can be entitled to child benefit for children living outside the Netherlands. 
Until 1 January 2000, entitlement to child benefit for children living outside the 
Netherlands was unrestricted. Since the introduction of the Export Restrictions on Benefits 
Act (BEU)10, however, entitlement has been restricted to children living in countries with 
which the Netherlands has concluded an agreement comprising an obligation to export 
benefits. 
 The AKW provides for entitlement to child benefit for insurants who care for or 
support children. This applies to a person’s own children, foster children or stepchildren.11 
The term ‘own child’ is not in itself a strictly legal term, but it has taken on a more specific 
legal meaning within the framework of case law and policy. In this context, ‘own child’ is 
taken to mean the children of the female insurant who is regarded as their mother pursuant 
to Article 1:198 of the Dutch Civil Code, and the children of the male insurant who is 
regarded as their father pursuant to Article 1:199 of the Netherlands Civil Code. As a 
consequence, acknowledged and adopted children are also considered as a person’s own 
children. 
 This leads to the question of whether a child that is acknowledged or adopted under 
non-Dutch law is also regarded as a person’s own child for the purposes of the AKW. On 
the face of it, one would think this would be answered by the provisions of international 
private law. That, however, is not the case. According to previous rulings by the Central 
Court of Appeal, whether a child is regarded as a person’s own on the basis of the national 
law designated by international private law is not of decisive importance for the 
application of social security law. This question must be answered using the applicable 
provisions of the laws concerned.12 For the application of the AKW, acknowledgements 
and adoptions that took place under non-Dutch legal systems only have the same legal 
consequences as adoptions and acknowledgements under Dutch law insofar that the 
requirements for and the legal consequences of those legal systems correspond with the 
Dutch equivalents.13 
                                                     
10
 See O.P. Brinkman, M.A.H. van Dalen-van Bekkum and W.H. Bel, Wet beperking export uitkeringen. PS-
special, 1999,  No.3. 
11
 Art. 7 AKW. 
12
 Central Court of Appeal 22 May 1991, KBW 1990/40 n.g.. 
13
 Central Court of Appeal 23 December 1987, RSV 1988/168. The fact that the rules of international private 
law are disregarded in case law can be explained from a legal perspective by the fact that the AKW itself 
does not attach any legal consequences to the acknowledgement or the adoption. As mentioned above, the 
law applies a substantive criterion, i.e. that of the ‘own child’, which has subsequently taken on a more 
specific legal meaning. Here, Dutch personal and family law (in the way in which it functions in context in 
Dutch society) was the frame of reference. The requirement then ensues that, if the foreign acknowledgement 
or adoption is to be accepted in the Netherlands, it must first be ascertained whether it corresponds to a 
sufficient extent with the Dutch equivalent. In situations where the social security laws themselves attach 
legal consequences to a family law situation, as in the case of marriage, the rules of international private law 
are considered applicable. This is not an entirely satisfactory situation, considering that, ultimately, Dutch 
personal and family law also served as the basis for the definitions in social security law itself. In Germany, 
the legal situation on this matter is more consistent. There, pursuant to paragraph 34 of the general part of the 
Sozialgesetzbuch,all foreign legal concepts are tested for equivalence to the German system: Soweit Rechte 
und Pflichten nach diesem Gesetzbuch ein familienrechtliches Rechtsverhältnis voraussetzen, reicht ein 
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From a perspective of multiculturality, the requirement of comparison of non-Dutch 
adoption or acknowledgement with those under Dutch law is, on the surface of it, not 
necessarily a problem. This comparison is not so much about cultural values and norms 
than about differences ensuing from legal systems. For instance, it is possible for a foreign 
adoption not to be accepted because the non-Dutch legal system does not incorporate the 
Dutch requirement that the adoptive parents first have to have actually taken care of the 
child for a number of years. This is an objective fact that has little to do with any clash of 
cultural values. But this example is just the tip of the iceberg.14 Differences in legal 
systems may also be based on cultural differences. This becomes apparent, for example, in 
the problem of Ghanaian acknowledgement and the AKW, which we discuss below. 
 
Acknowledgement in Ghana 
In Ghana, acknowledgement is still regulated by tribal law. The simple acceptance of a 
duty to provide for a child is sufficient for acknowledgement to apply. A wide circle of 
blood relations may accept such a duty, provided the person acknowledging the child has 
achieved a certain position with regard to income. In Ghana, marriage is seen to a lesser 
extent as a source of familial duties.  
 The question has arisen, in the context of implementation of the AKW, of whether 
the Ghanaian system of acknowledgement should be accepted. The Sociale 
Verzekeringsbank was of the opinion that it should not, because Ghanaian 
acknowledgement was too dissimilar to the Dutch system. In relation to Ghana, child 
benefit was henceforth exclusively reserved for children for whom it could be proved that 
they were born out of a legal or equivalent marriage.15 This has to be demonstrated with 
copies of marriage and birth certificates that have be authenticated twice.16 The effect of 
this policy was that child benefit for children living in Ghana had to be stopped in a large 
number of cases. Here we are seeing legal doctrine regarding non-Dutch legal concepts 
obstructing the importation of Ghanaian cultural values into the AKW. 
 
Foster children and the Kafala 
As regards the desirability of a multicultural social security law, opinions may differ on the 
Ghanaian example. But we would at least like to remark that, where the AKW extends 
entitlement to child benefit to children living outside the Netherlands, it seems reasonable 
to want to compare foreign legal concepts to the Dutch conditions. With such a generous 
provision, surely there should be some standards for relating entitlement to benefit to the 
objectives for which the Act was set up from a Dutch perspective. One must also realise 
that with the institution of the Export Restrictions on Benefits Act (BEU) in 1998, 
entitlement to child benefit for children living outside the Netherlands has been 
discontinued entirely, unless there is an international obligation in place to export benefits. 
                                                                                                                                                                
Rechtsverhältnis, das gemä Internationalem Privatrecht dem Recht eines anderen Staates unterliegt und 
nach diesem Recht besteht, nur aus, wenn es dem Rechtsverhältnis im Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzbuchs 
entspricht. 
14
 The example, moreover, is not so topical anymore. Pursuant to Art. 23 (1) in conjunction with Art (26)(a) 
of the Hague Adoption Convention, adoptions made in accordance with the convention are to be recognized 
in other contracting states. If the original family law ties are broken by the adoption, these children will have 
equal rights in the country of receipt to those ensuing from adoptions that have this consequence in each of 
these states. As the organisation that administers the AKW, the Sociale Verzekeringsbank (SVB) has now 
adjusted its policy on this matter. Adoptions that take place outside the Netherlands under the operation of 
the Hague Adoption Convention are henceforth recognized under the AKW. 
15
 RB Amsterdam 15 December 1995, 94/11368 AKW. 
16
 Ghana Decision AKW, Decision of 12 June 1996/No. 962820, Government Gazette.1996, No. 115. 
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There is no such obligation in relation to Ghana. From this angle, while the previous legal 
situation was not ideal, it was fairer to Ghanaians than the current situation.  
 Are foreign cultural values better respected if the whole family lives in the 
Netherlands? In situations where a child cannot be regarded as a person’s own, the AKW 
provides for entitlement to child benefit for ‘foster children’. Again, this is a factual term. 
In a foster child situation, a child is raised and supported in the household of the foster 
parent. The rationale behind entitlement to child benefit for foster children is to contribute 
towards the expenses of child maintenance in situations where the task of bringing up the 
child has been taken over by someone other than the child’s own parents. For people from 
different countries, however, foster parenthood may also serve as grounds for entitlement 
to child benefit if the foreign status of the child under family law does not allow for the 
qualification of ‘own child’ for the purpose of the AKW. For families from certain 
countries, therefore, the foster child provision has an extra value. In the example of the 
Kafala given below, however, it appears that the concept of foster child has not been 
elaborated entirely neutrally with respect to foreign cultural values. The Islamic legal 
instrument of the Kafala is to some extent comparable to our concept of foster child.17 It 
has been a recognised instrument in Morocco and Algeria for centuries. The Kafala is a 
document that transfers the authority to look after a child to other members of the family. 
As Islam forbids adoption in the interests of preserving lineage, the Kafala provides a good 
alternative. The Kafala is a kind of foster care system whereby lineage is not broken. The 
interdiction of using the Kafala parents’ surname sometimes even carries the punishment 
of disinheritance in some countries. The relations between the child and his or her natural 
parents under family law are not affected by this Kafala. The agreed authorities of the 
Kafala parents and the duration of the Kafala differ per document and are therefore not 
predefined. It is, however, possible to gather from the document whether it relates to the 
guardianship or the property of the minor, and also whether the authority to transfer 
guardianship via the Kafala lies with the father or the mother.  
 Within the framework of the current legal situation, the existence of the Kafala 
often offers no guarantee that the child will be regarded as a foster child for the purposes of 
the AKW, not even if the child has become part of the carer’s household. Previous rulings 
by the Central Court of Appeal show that the concept of foster child is only met when the 
insurant behaves, as far as the child’s upbringing is concerned, in such a way that he takes 
the place of the parents, and there is a relationship resembling that between child and 
parents. 18 If the child has a parent still living who is authorised and able to take and 
continue to take important decisions, it will not, in principle, be possible for foster 
parenthood to be assumed. In such a situation, the child’s carer can supervise the child and 
bear considerable responsibility for the child, but not exclusively. As long as there is a 
parent still living who has not been divested of parental authority, that parent will be 
expected to continue taking decisions relating to the child’s upbringing.19 As the AKW 
does not, in principle, accept foster parenthood if a living parent of the child is authorised 
and remains able to take important decisions, the legal system the Kafala, if the currently 
applicable policy is used, will not always be equated with our concept of fostering. This 
strict policy leads to situations in which the apparent foster parents are denied entitlement 
to child benefit whereas they reasonably think they should be entitled to it. The objective 
                                                     
17
 About the Kafala, see: L. Jordens-Cotran, Het Marokkaanse familierecht en de Nederlandse rechtspraktijk, 
Utrecht : Forum, 2000, p. 255 ff. 
18
 Central Court of Appeal 30 January 1991, RSV 1992/17. 
19
 Central Court of Appeal 29 July 1998, RSV 1998/288; if, however, the possibility to exercise parental 
authority and use parental powers has become merely theoretical, this does not stand in the way of another 
person taking over the task of raising the child from the natural parent(s). 
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of the AKW is, after all, to contribute toward the costs of a child’s maintenance and 
upbringing. As we have seen, there can be a situation in which children are cared for and 
brought up entirely by different people than their own parents, and are fully the financial 
responsibility of their carers, yet neither the Kafala parents nor their own parents (not 
residents, after all) are entitled to child benefit. No foster child situation is recognised for 
Kafala parents because of the sole fact that parental authority lies formally with a child’s 
own parent(s). One might ask oneself whether the Dutch legal situation should not be a bit 
more accommodating with respect to the Kafala and its significance in Islamic countries. 
 
1.3. The term ‘member of the family’ 
 
The interpretation and use of the term ‘member of the family’ is also liable to produce 
tension between cultural values in the field of social security. In the Netherlands, the 
significance of a person’s family situation weakened considerably as benefit entitlements 
became more independent in the course of the 1980s. Where family situation is still 
accorded relevance, a material criterion has come to be used. For instance, many 
provisions for establishing the amount of a benefit have a calculation basis for single 
people, single-parent families and married people. The married category, furthermore, 
includes unmarried persons of majority age who share a household with another unmarried 
person of majority age. This equation of marriage with a sharing a household is 
understandable from the viewpoint of the rationality of the social security system. When 
the amount of a benefit is determined, it is not so much the formal family status that is 
decisive but rather the question of whether household expenses are shared. Moreover, from 
the point of view of the cultural interpretation of the family, the result of the equation of 
marriage with a shared household is modern. The law abstracts from the grounds for living 
together, the sex of the partners, and issues of morality. It is exclusively the actual situation 
that matters for the outcome. 
 The modern view of marriage applied by Dutch social security law can sometimes 
be problematic in situations where benefits are exported abroad. In such cases, the social 
security organisation in the other country is asked to verify entitlements on the basis of 
factual investigations. This request is particularly liable to meet with incomprehension in 
Islamic countries. These countries are not always tolerant towards unmarried people living 
together, and are even less so if the partners happen to be of the same sex. This lack of 
understanding towards the Dutch benefit schemes does not exactly promote loyal 
cooperation from social security organisations abroad with regard to verification activities. 
Just as Dutch social security law cannot embrace foreign cultural values without problems, 
Dutch cultural values cannot be smoothly and seamlessly exported abroad. This puts the 
traditionally export-friendly nature of Dutch social security arrangements under pressure. 
As we already mentioned, the introduction of the Export Restrictions on Benefits Act in 
1998 restricted entitlement to Dutch benefits for people living abroad. Benefits are now 
only exported if an international export agreement has been concluded. The BEU Act is 
meant to safeguard proper verification and control. Export obligations are only entered into 
insofar that the Dutch government deems that the foreign authorities cooperate sufficiently 
with regard to verification and control.  
 
In addition to the effect of the Dutch concept of the member of the family as described 
above, foreign cultural values concerning the family are also permeating Dutch social 
security law and influencing the Dutch notion of the family, although it is not easy to find 
examples. The Dutch definition of marriage is entirely abstracted from cultural values, and 
the relevance of such values is neutralised, as it were. An example of adaptation of the 
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definition of the family to foreign family values can, however, be found in European social 
security law, to be more specific, in the recent Mesbah judgement by the European Court 
of Justice.20 In this case, the Labour Court in Brussels referred two questions to the Court 
for a preliminary ruling. The first question addressed whether the Moroccan mother-in-law 
of a Moroccan migrant worker established in Belgium could rely on the principle of non-
discrimination laid down in the EEC – Morocco Cooperation Agreement and be entitled to 
a disability allowance under Belgian law. The second question asked whether she as a 
mother-in-law could be regarded as a member of the family for the purposes of Article 
41(1) of the Agreement. This non-discrimination Article stipulates that ‘workers of 
Moroccan nationality and any members of their families living with them, are to enjoy, in 
the field of social security, treatment free from any discrimination based on nationality in 
relation to nationals of the Member States in which they are employed.’ 
 In its answer to the question on the interpretation of  ‘member of the family’ of the 
worker, the Court of Justice decided not to adopt the definition as found in EC Regulation 
1408/71. This regulation, which is aimed at the coordination of social security systems of 
migrant workers, refers, with regard to the meaning of this term, to the status of a person as 
a member of the family insofar as that status is recognised in the applicable national social 
security legislation. Instead, the Court of Justice refers to the text of Article 10 (1) of  
Regulation 1612/68, which contains a specific definition of relatives of migrant workers 
covered with regard to entitlement to residence status, which mentions blood relations in 
both the ascending and the descending line. It was concluded in this case that a worker’s 
Moroccan mother-in-law who had lived in his household in Belgium for ten years had to 
be regarded as a ‘member of the family’ for the purposes of Article 41(1) of the EEC-
Morocco Cooperation Agreement. In his conclusion, Advocate General Alber pointed out 
that the social security law interpretation of the term member of the family in Regulation 
1408/71 could work out very limited indeed in practise, whereas the Cooperation 
Agreement with Morocco must have envisaged a broader term. In his opinion, cultural 
factors lead Moroccan families to show much greater solidarity between the generations 
than European families, in order to cover themselves against the risk of a neglected and 
unprovided for old age. These cultural differences must have been known when the 
agreement was concluded; therefore, for a narrower definition of the term family member, 
an explicit arrangement would have had to have been included. 
 If there is one example that epitomises the influence of foreign cultural values on 
social security law it is this Mesbah judgment and the Advocate General’s conclusion. The 
specific social security law definition of the term member of the family is overruled by 
another definition – one founded on empathy with the migrant’s cultural background in his 
country of origin.  
 
 
2. A critical view 
 
It is not easy to distil a cohesive picture of the process of adoption of foreign cultural 
values in Dutch social security law from the case studies presented above. The examples 
that we have given are incidental, widely different in nature, and are not the result of 
systematic research. In working out these cases, we have developed a notion of how social 
security law might best absorb foreign cultural concepts. Our impression is that benefits 
schemes that employ material terms and conditions (and fit in with the person’s factual 
circumstances) are more satisfactory from the point of view of cultural tolerance than 
                                                     
20
 Court of Justice EC 11 November 1999, No. C-179/98 (Mesbah), RSV 2000/55. 
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arrangements that are based on formal legal notions. Let us recap on the examples. First of 
all, the criterion of residence in national insurance. As we saw, this criterion presupposes 
the necessity of establishing the intensity of the ties with the Netherlands on the merits of 
each separate case. The legislator has decided not to use fixed criteria to assess these ties. 
The consequence of this is that, for action between implementational policy and case law, 
sufficient space has been created to accommodate the term of resident to changed 
circumstances of migration. The criterion has finally evolved to the extent that it is 
possible to assess whether residence applies on the basis of objective criteria, regardless of 
the person’s background. In the second example, that of the Child Benefits Act, it was 
noted that the formal legal interpretation of the term own child is counter to consideration 
of the cultural background in the migrant’s country of origin. In case of entitlement to child 
benefit for children who live abroad, we have been able to appreciate this disadvantage, but 
if the entire family lives in the Netherlands, the legal situation is less than rosy. On the 
other hand, this objection is balanced by the fact that entitlement to child benefit is also 
open to foster children. Again, the term foster child is a purely factual criterion, as it is 
established on the basis of the circumstances in each case whether the child is cared for and 
brought up in the person’s own household. The example of the Islamic Kafala is therefore 
not so much directed against the foster child concept as such but rather against an overly 
rigid application of this concept in implementational practice. Within the AKW, a 
reinforcement of the position of foster parents with respect to that of the legal parents (for 
whom child benefit is not made payable) would indeed be a good development. 
 Finally, we discussed the modern definition of marriage in Dutch social security 
law, which is based on the equation of marriage with sharing a household. From a 
viewpoint of cultural tolerance, this equation is very important. It opens the way to 
recognition of alternative forms of living together without the law concerning itself with 
the cultural desirability of any of these forms. As mentioned previously, the definition of 
marriage abstracts from cultural values. The equation of marriage with sharing a household 
is sometimes liable to meet with incomprehension. Such lack of understanding has to do 
with people’s strong attachment to their own culture and consequent inability to show 
understanding towards the heterogeneity of cohabitation forms recognised in the 
Netherlands. Here, other countries are showing a lack of multiculturality. Moreover, Dutch 
social security law does not oblige anyone to share a household; formal marriage has the 
same status. 
 We could conclude that, from a viewpoint of multiculturality, the introduction of 
legal concepts that are based on a person’s factual situation is preferable to concepts based 
on a person’s formal legal status. However, if this conclusion is correct, it is also needs 
qualifying. Benefits schemes that are based on material characteristics of the beneficiary 
are a burden on implementation and are more difficult to verify and control. This 
disadvantage manifests itself primarily in situations in which beneficiaries live outside the 
Netherlands. If the Dutch social security system is to retain anything of its traditionally 
export-friendly character21, legal concepts that are sensitive with regard to verification and 
control must be introduced with caution. Viewed like this, between the dream of a 
multicultural social security law and its realisation stand not only formal legal notions but 
also practical objections - and interests, too. After all, let us not forget that the possibility 
to export benefits largely meets the interests of minority groups which often maintain 
intensive ties with the country of origin. 
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